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ABSTRACT 
We study whether local land use policies are modified in response to 
enhanced demand for building generated by the construction of a new 
highway, and examine the extent to which this mediating effect of land use 
regulations affects building activity. Our analysis focuses on the case of 
Spain during the last housing boom, 1995-2007. For this period, we 
assembled a new database with information about new highway segments 
and details about the modification of the zoning status of land in nearby 
municipalities. The empirical strategy compares the variation in the amount 
of developable land before-after the construction of the highway in treated 
municipalities and in control municipalities with similar pre-treatment traits, 
this latter group being selected using matching techniques. Our results show 
that, following the construction of a highway, municipalities converted a 
huge amount of land from rural to urban uses. The amount of land converted 
after the construction of the highway was greater: (i) the stronger the 
demand shock, and (ii) the easier it was to build out, but also (iii) the lower 
the amount of vacant land to start with, and (iv) the less the opposition 
expressed by locals. We also show that new highways have an impact on 
building activity. 
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1. Introduction 
Land use regulations are a ubiquitous feature of land and housing markets. In the US, urban 
growth boundaries place limits on the spatial expansion of urban areas (see, e.g., Hannah et 
al., 1993), and zoning ordinances designate permitted uses of land (i.e., open space, 
agricultural, commercial, industrial, and residential uses) and regulate many other aspects of 
development (see, e.g., Glickfeld and Levine, 1992)
1
. Other countries similarly employ very 
detailed systems of land planning
2
. These regulations are justified on the grounds that they 
prevent the negative external effects associated with the proximity of incompatible land uses 
(see Moore, 1978). However, in practice, these regulations are also used to prevent new 
development from interfering with existing residents’ interests and to preserve the ‘character’ 
of a community. As a result, they also constrain the supply of housing and raise housing costs 
(e.g., Glaeser and Gyourko, 2003, and Glaeser and Ward, 2006). The net effect of these 
regulations on welfare is difficult to determine, although there is little evidence of a net 
positive effect (see McMillen and McDonald, 1993, and Turner et al., 2011).  
Moreover, some authors even suggest that ‘the regulations tend to coincide with, or 
anticipate, the market solution rather than modify it’ (Wallace, 1988, p.307). From this 
‘zoning follows the market’ view, regulations would be unnecessary because the government 
would provide the same land use pattern as that afforded by the unconstrained market. Such a 
situation might come about as the private agreements reached by the parties tend to mimic 
centralized decisions dealing with externalities (see Fischel, 1985). It might also be the case 
that local governments cater in the main to development-related interests as opposed to those 
of homeowners (see Molotch, 1976, Solé-Ollé and Viladecans-Marsal, 2012, and Hilber and 
Robert-Nicoud, 2013) so, eventually, when obliged to modify their planning documents, they 
tend to take decisions that allow proposed developments to go ahead. Moreover, seen from 
this perspective, not only are land use regulations meaningless, they are also likely to have a 
detrimental effect. This is the case, for example, if a government’s response to market forces 
is delayed thereby reducing the supply elasticity of housing and contributing to housing price 
increases (see Mayer and Somerville, 2000, and Glaeser and Ward, 2006). 
                                                 
1
 These regulations also impose all sorts of requirements on new development: building heights and 
densities, the location of a building on the lot, the proportions of the types of space on a lot (e.g., how 
much landscaped space is required), whether or not parking should be provided, etc. Besides the 
specificities of regulations, red-tape and delays in the permitting process are also a concern (see 
Gyourko et al., 2008). 
2 See, e.g., Cheshire and Sheppard (2004) and Riera et al. (1991) on the UK and Spanish cases, 
respectively. These policies are mostly the responsibility of local governments, but higher layers of 
government might also play a role in some countries. 
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In this paper, we examine whether land use policies do indeed follow market forces by 
studying whether local governments respond to demand shocks by amending existing 
planning documents and allowing more land to be developed. More specifically, we study the 
decisions of Spanish local governments to convert land from rural (i.e., open space, 
agricultural) to urban uses (i.e., commercial, industrial, and residential) during the last 
housing boom (i.e., from 1995 to 2007), focusing on a specific kind of demand shock, namely 
the construction of a highway in the municipality. To do so, we study the effects during that 
period of the construction of a new highway segment on the growth in the amount of land 
designated for development, focusing specifically on the timing of these effects. We then 
analyze whether these effects are heterogeneous, presenting estimates for sub-samples 
classified in terms of (i) the strength of the demand shock, and (ii) the existence of 
geographical constraints, but also in terms of (iii) the amount of vacant land at the outset, and 
(iv) whether locals are favorable/opposed to development. Finally, we study the effect of 
highway construction on housing market outcomes, including, the growth in developed land 
and the rise in the number of housing units. 
The paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, no papers have previously analyzed the way in which local governments make 
planning or zoning decisions following a demand shock. In this paper, we show just how 
active Spanish local governments (or at least some of them) are following the construction of 
a highway
3
. Moreover, no papers have compared the overall effect and the timing of a 
demand shock on both land use decisions and building activity. Here, by comparing the 
response of land conversion, on the one hand, and land development and housing 
construction, on the other, we are able to draw relevant conclusions as to whether land 
planning decisions anticipate market forces and about the time required for this to happen.  
Second, no previous papers would appear to have analyzed the interaction between 
highway construction, a function typically shared between state and federal governments, and 
land use regulations, a local responsibility in most countries. Clearly, in countries operating 
this kind of institutional arrangement, the layers of government in charge of funding, planning 
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 Moreover, although some studies have been made of the determinants of land use regulations (e.g., 
Bates and Santerre, 1994 and 2001; Evenson and Wheaton, 2003; Glaeser et al., 2005; Dehring et al., 
2008; Hilber and Robert-Nicoud, 2013; Sáiz, 2010), all of them draw on a cross-section of data (owing 
presumably to data limitations), focused most invariably on indicators aggregated at the metro area 
level (e.g., Hilber and Robert-Nicoud, 2013; Sáiz, 2010). Only a few papers to date have focused on 
actual local policy decisions (see, e.g., Kahn, 2011; Solé-Ollé and Viladecans-Marsal, 2012 and 2013), 
thus analyzing the response of policy-makers to local conditions when decisions are made. 
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and building highways need to be aware of local planning responses when evaluating the 
effects of a new project. 
 Third, although there is a sizeable body of literature on the impact of highway 
construction on local development (e.g., Rephann and Isserman, 1994; Lokshin and Yemtsov, 
2005; Chen et al., 2009; Mu and van de Walle, 2011)
4
, these studies do not consider the 
possibility that the impact of highways on the local economy might be mediated by the way in 
which local policies (and in particular, local planning) are drawn up and, as such, by the 
workings of the local political process. However, one weakness that is recognized by this line 
in the literature is its lack of attention to the heterogeneity of the effect of roads (see van de 
Walle, 2009). One of the few papers to deal with this issue is Rephann and Isserman (1994), 
who find that the effects of the extension of the inter-state highway system in the U.S. are 
positive only for places in close proximity to a sizeable urban area. A point that we stress in 
this paper is that we also expect the effect of highways to be greater in locations where the 
market is larger (i.e., in urban areas), but that the positive effect of new highways might be 
restricted to an even smaller set of locations (e.g., those where locals are favorable to 
development).   
Fourth, although there is a growing body of literature examining the effects of highways 
on city growth and urban sprawl (e.g., Duranton et al., 2012, Baum-Snow et al., 2012, Garcia-
López 2012 and Garcia-López et al., 2013), these studies are not concerned with the impact 
on land occupation and land uses but only on population and employment growth
5
. Yet, one 
of the problems created by urban sprawl is the enormous consumption of open space
6
. 
Funderburg et al. (2010) study the effects of roads on changes in land use patterns, but in 
common with the papers cited above, they do not study the impact of road construction on 
local land use policies, which jointly with the road itself determines urbanization outcomes. 
Several papers do analyze the effect of land use regulations on housing construction (e.g., 
Mayer and Somerville, 2000), but none considers the interaction with highway construction. 
                                                 
4
 The literature on the effects of highways is much older and forms a larger body. The geographical 
focus has shifted from the national (e.g., Aschauer, 1989; Fernald, 1999) to the regional (e.g., Holtz-
Eakin, 1994; Garcia-Milà and McGuire, 1992, Garcia-Milà et al., 1996), and then to the local level 
(e.g., Chandra and Thompson, 2000; Rephann and Isserman, 1994). The volume of literature in the 
case of Spain is also great (e.g., De la Fuente et al., 1995, Mas et al., 1996, and Boscá et al., 2002, 
among many others), but most studies draw on regional data (see Holl, 2004, for an exception). Here, 
we focus on papers examining the effects at a small geographical scale.  
5
 Baum-Snow (2007) and Baum-Snow et al. (2012) analyze the effect of highway construction on 
population suburbanization in the US and China, and Garcia-López (2012) and Garcia-López et al. 
(2013) study the same question with Spanish data; Duranton and Turner (2012) focus on the effect on 
city growth in the US. 
6
 See the European Environmental Agency (2006) and Greenpeace (2010) for evidence on this issue 
for Europe and Spain.  
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Fifth, we believe there are various reasons why Spanish local governments provide an 
excellent testing ground for these hypotheses. Periodically, they are required to pass  
comprehensive land planning documents, specifying which land plots can be developed and 
which have to remain undeveloped, at least until future amendments are made to the plan. 
Fortunately, we have been able to access a unique database that measures the impact of these 
decisions on land conversion. Second, Spanish local governments enjoy almost complete 
freedom in areas related to town planning. Third, the period analyzed witnessed a demand 
shock of an extraordinary magnitude, creating extremely high expectations of residential 
construction growth, which forced local governments to take decisions as to whether to permit 
this growth (and so modify the planning documents thereby allowing more land to be 
converted from rural to urban uses) or to remain passive and not permit any additional growth 
that had not been planned for before the boom.  
Sixth, it is our contention that a focus on the demand shocks generated by new highway 
segments offers certain advantages. Indeed, the construction of such segments is an easily 
identifiable event that enables us to define quite clearly a treated set of municipalities (those 
gaining access to a new highway) and a set of controls (those not gaining access). And, 
although highway location is obviously not exogenous, it is our belief that this problem is 
much attenuated when we compare the before-after evolution in land use outcomes in treated 
vs. control municipalities that are similar in terms of certain basic determinants of the 
geographical allocation of new highway segments (including pre-treatment outcomes and pre-
treatment accessibility to a main road). Our empirical methodology builds on the previous 
literature dedicated to road project evaluation (see van de Walle, 2009, for a survey). In line 
with many other papers in this tradition we combine a before-after analysis with matching 
techniques (see Rephann and Isserman, 1994; Chen et al., 2007, Lokshin and Yemtsov, 2005, 
and Mu and van de Walle, 2011).  
Our analysis shows that, following the construction of a new highway segment, the 
municipalities converted a huge amount of land from rural to urban uses. Moreover, land 
conversion took place in the first half of the period, coinciding with the initiation of the 
project. We also confirm that the amount of land converted after the construction of the 
highway was greater in places with higher demand (i.e., urban areas) and low geographic 
constraints (i.e., favorable topography). However, land conversion was also greater in places 
where local residents were more favorable to development (e.g., places with a low percentage 
of homeowners and commuters) and/or in places where development interests had more 
influence over the local planning process (e.g., municipalities controlled by right-wing parties 
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and majority governments). We also show that new highways had an impact on real estate 
outcomes including the amount of land developed and the number of housing units. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the system of land use 
regulation in Spain and the evolution of our outcome variables during the period of study. In 
this section we also describe the expansion of the Spanish highway network in recent decades 
and, especially, during the period of study. Section 3 describes the methodology used in the 
analysis. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Institutions and data 
2.1 Local land use regulations 
In Spain, there are more than 8,000 municipalities, although most are small (60% with fewer 
than 1,000 inhabitants). Municipalities are democratically elected governments with the usual 
responsibilities for local spending and taxation
7
. One of their main tasks is land use 
regulation. Here, municipalities are responsible for specifying and implementing zoning 
regulations, subject to basic legislation enacted by central and regional governments, and 
subject also to regional oversight
8
. 
Land use regulations in Spain are controlled by a highly detailed, rigid system (see Riera 
et al., 1991), but they differ little from the zoning regulations operative in various parts of the 
US. An essential characteristic of the Spanish system is that, although an individual might 
own the land, the government is empowered to control and implement all processes of urban 
development. Landowners cannot develop their land without the prior agreement of the local 
administration. It is not simply that they need a building license: before reaching this step, the 
government must have declared the land ‘developable’ and have defined the precise 
conditions for such development. The main tool that the government uses to achieve this is its 
urban plan. Municipalities draw up a ‘General Plan’, which provides a three-way land 
classification: developed land, developable land (those areas of the community where future 
development is allowed), and non-developable land  (the rest of the territory – agrarian and 
                                                 
7
 Municipalities are multi-purpose governments with responsibilities for the typical range of local 
public services (including, refuse collection and treatment, water supply, street lighting and paving, 
parks and recreation, cultural and sports facilities, etc.). See Solé-Ollé (2012) for a detailed description 
of local public finances in Spain. 
8
 The regional government can reject local zoning regulations on the grounds of their interference with 
regional policies, including, for example, regional infrastructure provision (roads, water pipelines, 
etc.), regionally protected lands, etc. The general opinion, however, is that during the last boom 
regional governments were largely ineffective in detaining local development. Thus, while in theory 
regional governments can stop development invoking regional policy priorities, they are unable to 
force local governments to accept the quantity or the type of development they seek. 
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other uses, where the development process is strictly prohibited, at least until a new plan is 
approved). Figure 1 illustrates how this classification works and how the land uses may 
change after the amendment of the plan.  
Insert Figure 1 
The ‘General Plan’ has to be updated from time to time in order to adapt land use 
regulation to economic and demographic changes. The process of amending the ‘General 
Plan’ is quite complex. The plan is drawn up by the government team and then has to be 
approved by the city council. There are many transparency and participation requirements 
involving both the opposition and the citizenship. These tasks might take at least an entire 
term-of-office to be completed. Land uses can also be modified during the implementation of 
the plan, via what is known as an amendment (or ‘Partial’) plan. These changes are also 
subject to binding legal requirements, but tend to be implemented somewhat faster. In any 
case, success in having the new plan approved and the speed of that process depend on the 
mayor’s strength9. 
Fortunately for our purposes, we enjoyed access to a new dataset that provides 
information on these land use categories at the municipal level. The information is provided 
by the Spanish property assessment agency (Dirección General del Catastro, Ministerio de 
Hacienda, http//www.catastro.meh.es) and is derived as a by-product of the assessment 
process that this agency undertakes on all properties in the country. This database provides 
information on the amount of developable land (‘suelo urbanizable’), developed land (‘suelo 
construido’) and on the number of housing units (‘unidades urbanas’). Our empirical analysis 
focuses on the evolution of the amount of developable land during the last housing boom, that 
is, the period that runs from 1995 to 2007. These years cover the whole period of expansion in 
the Spanish housing market
10
. The main variable of interest is the increase in developable 
land during this period measured relative to developed land at the beginning of the period 
(i.e., in 1995). This variable is labeled as di,t-t0, and computed as di,t-t0 = (Di,t   - Di,t0)/Bi,t0, 
                                                 
9
 Municipal councils in Spain are elected every four years. After the election, the new council elects a 
mayor who then decides on the composition of the executive. Due to their agenda-setting powers and 
to the high level of party discipline, Spanish mayors enjoy great influence, especially when they are 
governing in majority or with a stable coalition. Highly fragmented councils might hinder the approval 
of any new regulations (including planning amendments). Majorities backed by landslide electoral 
victories might likewise find it easier to promote urban expansion, even if voters are opposed to such 
measures (see Solé-Ollé and Viladecans-Marsal, 2012). 
10
 The housing market collapsed in 1992 after a boom that started in the middle of the 1980s. After 
1995, housing construction and housing prices started to grow again. The growth accelerated after 
2001 and peaked by the end of 2007. This period also coincides with the years for which the database 
on land use categories is available.  
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where Di,t0 and Di,t  are the amounts of developable land at the beginning of the period and at 
some latter date (i.e., 1999, 2003 or 2007) and Bi,t0 is the amount of developed land at the 
beginning of the period. Note that, in terms of the land categories in Figure 1, this variable is 
the ratio between the purple and orange areas. This variable can be interpreted as the 
government’s planned percentage increase in city size during a given period (see Solé-Ollé 
and Viladecans-Marsal, 2012 and 2013).  
The first row of Table 1 presents the value of this variable for several years during this 
period. Between 1995 and 1999 the increase in developable land amounted to 28.6% of the 
amount of land already developed in 1995; this proportion jumped to 73.3% in 2003 and to 
113.5% in 2007. The second row of Table 1 presents information about the level of this 
variable, i.e. the amount of developable land, or the summation of the increase during the 
period (first row) and the amount of vacant land in 1995 (i.e., the amount of land that had 
been designated for development but that had not yet been developed). The amount of vacant 
land is also computed relative to the size of the city in 1995 as vi,t0 = (Di,t0  - Bi,t0)/Bi,t0
11
. In 
1995, the amount of vacant land was equivalent to 70.2% of the initial city size. This share 
rose to 98.9% in 1999, to 145.3% in 2003 and to 183.7% in 2007.  
Insert Table 1 
The other two rows in Table 1 also show the evolution of the two construction outcomes 
we are able to examine, namely, the growth in the amount of developed land and the growth 
in the number of housing units. Regarding this first outcome, note that the amount of 
developed land (labeled as bi,t-t0 and computed as bi,t-t0 = (Bi,t   - Bi,t0)/Bi,t0) grew by 18.7% 
during 1995-99, by 45.5% during 1995-2003, and by 51.8% during 1995-2007. The evolution 
is similar in the case of housing units, although the rates of growth are smaller, suggesting 
that growth has been very land intensive
12
. 
Note that, since both developable and developed land have both been measured with 
respect to the initial size of the city, their evolution can be readily compared. Thus, according 
to these data, the real growth in city size during this period was quite staggeringly high  
(approximately 50% growth across the whole period), although it was much lower than 
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 Note that the increase in the amount of vacant land over the period is equal to the increase in 
developable land (i.e., vi,t-t0 = ((Di,t   - Bi,t0) - (Di,0   - Bi,t0))/Bi,t0 = (Di,t   - Di,t0)/Bi,t0=di,t-t0). 
12
This means that a large share of land consumption during this period involved a larger amount of 
land per housing unit and also the greater use of land for other uses, such as business activities, 
parking lots and infrastructures. According to data obtained from the aerial photographs of the Corine 
Land Cover project (Ministerio de Fomento, 2006), most development between 1987 and 2000 took 
the form of low-density urban growth (up by 30%) and scattered growth (up by 26%), while the area 
undergoing compact development increased by a mere 4.1 per cent. 
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planned city growth (at more than 100%). There are several potential explanations for these 
differences. First, in places without sufficient vacant land at the outset, the planning 
documents had to be amended before construction could commence, while the consequent 
construction projects also required a number of years to reach completion. Planning 
amendments can take several years to be passed, so that development suffers further lags
13
. 
Second, it might also be the case that city councils care less about mistakes in forecasting 
demand than do developers, so (in places where people are favorable to growth) they tend to 
convert large tracts of land from rural to urban uses, even if there is some risk that the land 
will not subsequently be developed. Third, although these statistics show that, on average, 
Spanish municipalities did allow huge amounts of land to be developed, we do not know 
whether this increase in land supply occurred in places where there was the greatest need for 
land.   
2.3 Highway construction 
Over the last three decades, Spain undertook a highly ambitious expansion of its highway 
network. During the period 1980-2011 more than 10,000 km of new highways were built (see 
Table 2). Highway construction was especially intense during the 1980s and early 1990s, 
given the importance attached to it in the socialist party’s agenda and also as a result of the 
arrival of huge amounts of European funds earmarked for this purpose (see Solé-Ollé, 2013). 
Note, however, that a substantial number of highways were constructed in Spain throughout 
all the periods analyzed. The period from 2003 to 2007 (the one analyzed here) is the one with 
the highest number of kilometers of new highways built (i.e., a total of 2,446 km)
14
. However, 
the percentage growth in the number of kilometers of highways was much lower than that in 
the earlier periods, due to the fact that the main network had already been completed. 
Insert Table 2 
Figure 2 shows the Spanish highway network in 2000 (in dark blue), the new highway 
segments built during the periods 2000-2003 (in light blue) and 2003-2007 (in red), and the 
network of Main roads (in grey). This map was drawn using information collected from 
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 So, in the Spanish case, it could be that construction extended after the start of the housing bust in 
2008 due to these lags. Land conversion should in theory have stopped after the start of the crisis 
although, given the lengthy approval processes of planning amendments, it might also have been the 
case that some expansionary plans were approved during the housing bust (i.e., after 2007).  
14
 The use of a longer period would have given us more highway segments to analyze, but is 
unfeasible due to lack of data. Recall that land use data is available since 1995. As we will explain 
latter, we are also going to test whether highways build during 2003-2007 did have some influence on 
land policies enacted in previous periods (e.g., in 1999-2003 and in 1995-1999), which means that 
highways built during these periods can not be used for the analysis.   
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annual official road maps for the years 1999, 2003 and 2007 published by the Ministry of 
Public Works (http://www.fomento.es). Using GIS software, we created digital vector maps 
with polylines (highway and other main road segments). Using a layer of municipality 
boundaries provided by the National Geographic Institute (http://www.ign.es), we were then 
able to associate new highway segments with municipalities. This is basically how we 
identified the set of potentially treated municipalities (see next section for more details). 
During the period 2003-2007, a total of 291 municipalities gained access to a new highway 
segment, i.e., a new highway segment with ramps was built in the jurisdiction of the 
municipality. Only 14 of these municipalities did not have access to a Main road prior to 
obtaining highway access. This suggests that having access to the main road network is an 
important determinant of the decision to build a new highway. We take this into account in 
our identification strategy (see next section). 
Insert Figure 2 
Some specific traits of the network should be noted. First, overall, the highway network 
is highly radial, with many highways emanating out from Madrid towards cities in the 
periphery. As documented elsewhere, this is a traditional characteristic of road building in 
Spain (see Bel, 2010, and Garcia-López et al., 2013). Second, while this radial structure is 
evident in the 2000 network, it is not the case of new segments built after 2000. The main 
purpose of highways built during the periods 2000-2003 and 2000-2007 was to improve 
connectivity between medium-sized cities, and no longer to link medium-sized cities in the 
periphery with the capital, Madrid. Good examples of such segments are those located on the 
A-66 highway running North-South parallel to the Portuguese border (the so-called ‘Autovía 
de la Plata’) and the A-23 highway in the North-East of Spain, linking Zaragoza and Teruel. 
These traits have certain implications for the properties of the identification strategy we select 
for this paper (see next section).  
3. Empirical strategy 
3.1 Methodological options 
One of the most challenging problems faced in evaluating the effects of road construction on 
economic outcomes is that places that gain access to a new road probably differ from places 
that do not gain such access. The literature evaluating the effects of road construction has 
dealt with this problem in different ways (see van de Valle, 2009).  
First, some authors argue that comparing the evolution over time of the economic 
outcome of interest (e.g., firm location, housing construction, etc.) in places that gained vs. 
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places that failed to gain access to the road (i.e., using ‘difference-in-differences’ or fixed 
effects) is sufficient to control for unobserved municipal heterogeneity and for potential 
problems of simultaneity in economic outcomes and in the location of the new road projects. 
For example, Holl (2004) uses a fixed-effects Poisson model to study the effect of highway 
construction on the location of firms in Spain. She argues that fixed effects are appropriate 
when the simultaneous nature of the outcome (firm location in this case) and highway 
location is due to particular location-specific characteristics. She explains why this has been 
the case in Spain by arguing that in many cases the road plans designed by the Spanish 
government chose to build highways by doubling up the number of lanes of the existing 
national roads. She notes that places with access to a national road were also more attractive 
for firm location prior to the construction of the new highway. Fixed effects would also 
control for topographical traits that might influence the route of the highway (highways tend 
to avoid, more than national roads, rugged terrain).  
Second, other papers complement the use of ‘difference-in-difference’ methods (DiD) 
with a more careful selection of the control group. The DiD analysis is based on an implicit 
assumption: in the absence of the intervention, economic outcomes would have evolved over 
time similarly in treated and control units (see Blundell and Costa Dias, 2009). Note that this 
may not be the case in the example discussed above: places with access to a national road 
might have grown more than places without such access even in the absence of the highway 
upgrade. A strategy for dealing with this problem involves comparing places where road 
access has been upgraded (from national road to highway) with places that have access to a 
national road but which did not get an upgrade. Obviously, even places that already had a 
national road before the treatment period can be heterogeneous; after all, there must be a 
reason why the government decided to upgrade one national road and not another, so there is 
still room for improving the selection of the control group. Many papers use matching 
techniques to improve this selection. Here the aim is to select a subset of control units that are 
similar to the treated units in those traits that are a priori expected to influence both the 
probability of treatment and the evolution of the outcome variable. Rephann and Isserman 
(1994) adopt this approach, applying a sequential caliper and matching treated and control 
units using a similarity measure (based on the Mahalanobis distance). Indeed, many papers in 
this literature adopt this latter approach (see, e.g. Chen et al., 2007, Lokshin and Yemtsov, 
2005, Mu and van de Walle, 2011).  
The main assumption of matching is the so-called ‘conditional independence 
assumption’ or ‘unconfoundedness’ (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Blundell and Costa 
Dias, 2009; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). This basically means that, conditional on 
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observed covariates, no unobserved factors are associated both with the treatment and with 
potential outcomes. This assumption may be controversial but it is surely more reasonable 
when matching is used in combination with DiD methods (see Blundell and Costa Dias, 
2009), since some of the unobserved covariates might be time-invariant. Moreover, the 
availability of panel data also facilitates the assessment of the validity of the 
‘unconfoundedness’ assumption (see Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009).  
Third, a further possibility is to provide a compelling argument to show that highway 
location is exogenous. For example, Chandra and Thompson (2000) argue that highway 
construction is endogenous in urban areas but exogenous in rural areas. Holl (2004) argues 
that, in the Spanish case, the stated purpose of road plans is to improve the connectivity 
between Spain’s main cities, which means that the decision to build a new highway is 
probably influenced by the growth prospects of nodal cities, but unaffected by the 
characteristics of places located in intermediate segments. By using a small geographical unit 
(e.g., municipalities or highway segments), it would thus be possible to eradicate this 
problem. However, for this argument to have some validity it must be the case that the units 
analyzed belong to intermediate highway segments. An inspection of the Spanish highway 
network (see previous section) suggests that this was probably not the case for most of the 
segments built during the last three decades. The claim seems to be more valid for the 
segments built during the period 2003-07, the one analyzed here. An additional problem is 
that in many cases more than one route might connect two nodal cities; the government 
chooses between these routes by taking into consideration various technical aspects (e.g., 
ruggedness and land availability) as well as other differentials (e.g., population size or even 
political clout). This means that, even in this case, these differences need to be dealt with 
when selecting the control group. 
Fourth, some recent papers deal with the endogeneity issue by seeking an exogenous 
source of variation in road construction. For example, Baum-Snow (2007) and Duranton and 
Turner (2012) employ the road network planned many years before and/or information from 
historical road networks. They claim that the planned/historical road network was designed 
with purposes in mind that were unrelated to future local growth (e.g., connectivity between 
major cities, exploration routes). For the Spanish case, Garcia-López (2012) and Garcia-
López et al. (2013) use historical maps from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. They 
argue that these old road networks were built with the purpose of connecting the capital city, 
Madrid, with the periphery so as to facilitate military control of the territory and/or to foster 
nation building (see also Bel, 2010). They document that the modern highway network has 
the same radial structure and can, thus, be explained in part by the old historical network. The 
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exogeneity of such instruments relies on the various motives underpinning construction in the 
past, but it can only hold after conditioning for a range of demographic and geographic 
covariates
15
. In any case, unfortunately, we are not able to use the instruments constructed by 
Garcia-López et al. (2013) in this paper, the reason being the segments we analyze (built 
during 2003-2007) do not follow the old radial network (see previous section), which means 
that the instruments are unable to explain satisfactorily the location of the more recent 
highway projects. 
In short, having reviewed these methodological approaches, we conclude that, in our 
case, the best way to proceed is by seeking to select the best possible control group for our 
treated municipalities and then to compare the time evolution of the outcome variables for 
these two groups. The following sections describe how we define the treated and control 
groups and also how we estimate the effects of highway construction.  
3.2. Research design  
Sample. Our starting sample includes 1,841 municipalities and reflects the availability of our 
data. The information on new highway segments covers the whole of Spain (with the 
exception of the Canary Islands), but the database on land use categories is not available for 
certain regions (the Basque Country and Navarra) and the information is incomplete for many 
municipalities (especially for 1995, which is the start year of the database). Moreover, most of 
the other databases used are restricted to municipalities over 1,000 inhabitants, meaning that 
the smallest municipalities have been eliminated from our sample. We have also eliminated 
some municipalities for which we were unable to find information regarding some of the 
control variables. The eventual database includes virtually all municipalities with more than 
5,000 inhabitants and aproximately 50% of those with between 1,000 and 5,000. We believe 
the final sample to be representative of the population, at least for the municipalities with 
more than 1,000 residents
16
.  
Treated municipalities. We define our treated units as the municipalities in our sample 
that gained highway access during the period 2003-07 but which had access to a main road in 
2003. Panel (a) in Figure 3 illustrates the selection of treated municipalities in a hypothetical 
                                                 
15
 The main Spanish cities already existed when these road networks were built and these old roads 
even sought to avoid highly rugged terrain.  
16
 Various checks performed suggest that our sample is representative of the whole population. First, 
we compared our sample with the municipalities for which we have land use information (those used 
to construct the data for Table 1) and the numbers are not very different. We also compared the 
variables for which we have information for all municipalities with between 1,000 and 5,000 residents 
(e.g., population, land area, population of the urban area, ruggedness, etc.) finding no differences. 
Results are available upon request. 
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‘local labor market’. Treated municipalities are those represented in violet: both a main road 
and a new highway cross their jurisdiction. Municipalities represented in blue are not directly 
treated (i.e., they did not obtain a new highway) but they belong to the same ‘local labor 
market’ as a municipality gaining highway access, and so they constitute an alternative set of 
treated municipalities. We use these municipalities to assess whether the effects of highways 
‘spill over’ the boundaries of the municipalities directly affected by the highway. 
Municipalities in green are not treated because of a lack of data. 
Insert Figure 3 
As explained in the previous section, 291 municipalities gained access to a new highway 
during the period 2003-2007. Of these, 14 did not have access to a main road prior to that 
period. This suggests that restricting the analysis to the sample with prior access to a main 
road might make sense: places with and without prior access to a main road might simply not 
be comparable. Of the remaining 277 municipalities (=291-14), 129 have fewer than 1,000 
residents, and 54 have between 1,000 and 5,000 residents, but we did not have access to all 
the required data for them. This leaves us with 99 municipalities that: (i) gained highway 
access between 2003-2007, (ii) already had access to a main road in 2003, and (iii) for which 
we have all the data. Figure 4 illustrates the location of these treated municipalities in the 
map, highlighting both the relevant highway segment and municipal boundaries.  
Insert Figure 4 
Control municipalities. We define our control units as the municipalities that fulfill three 
conditions: (i) did not gain highway access between 2003-07, (ii) had access to a main road in 
2003 but not to a highway, and (iii) did not belong to the same ‘local labor market’ as any of 
the treated municipalities. We use the ‘local labor markets’ constructed by Boix and Galletto 
(2004) based on commuting patterns. In our sample, we have 742 municipalities that already 
had access to a highway in 2003; these have to be discarded as controls. The remaining 986 
municipalities (=1,827 – 742 – 99) did not have highway access in 2007. Of these, 663 did 
have access to a main road in 2003, and 323 were located in a ‘local labor market’ not 
containing any of our treated municipalities. These 323 municipalities, therefore, constitute 
our control group. The exclusion of municipalities not gaining direct access to the highway 
but belonging to the same ‘local labor market’ as the treated units serves to ensure that the 
controls are not affected by the treatment
17
, since this would bias the estimated effect of the 
                                                 
17 This is known in the evaluation literature as the SUTVA (Stable Unit Treatment Assumption) and 
states that “the potential outcome of one unit should be unaffected by the particular assignment of 
treatment to the other units” (see Cox 1958).  
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highway on economic outcomes
18
. As explained above, we use these municipalities as an 
alternative treatment group, allowing for the possibility that the effect of highways extends 
beyond the boundaries of the municipality obtaining the new highway. In Panel (b) of Figure 
3 we illustrate the selection of controls belonging to a hypothetical ‘local labor market’ 
(different from that in Panel (a), from which we have selected the treated units). 
Municipalities depicted in yellow are the controls, because they had access to a main road and 
did not gain access to a new highway. Municipalities in pink are not used as controls, either 
because they already had access to a highway before that period or because they do not have 
access to a main road. Finally, municipalities in green are potential controls, but we have no 
data for these.  
Timing of treatment. As explained above, we have good information regarding the 
period in which the highways were completed. By comparing 2003 and 2007 road maps, we 
can determine which municipalities gained highway access during this period. What we do 
not know, however, is the timing of other important events in the construction of a highway. 
When did the construction of the highway segment begin? When was the tender for the 
highway segment awarded? When did the government include an item for this project in its 
budget? When did a preliminary project for the highway first become available? When was 
the highway included in a road plan? The timing of these decisions (and not solely the 
completion of the road) might also be relevant for our analysis, especially if local 
governments have access to this information and use it to forecast whether a new highway 
will be accessible in a near future. 
Although, we do not have the details of all these steps for all highway segments, we can 
predict what the average timing is and what should be the appropriate response of a given 
local government. We know, for example, that the construction of a highway segment of 
average length (say 10 to 20 km) takes around two years. We also know that the time lag 
between a decision being taken by the government to include a project in its budget and the 
start of construction is approximately two years (a period in which the many complications of 
the tendering process have to be resolved)
19
. Clearly, prior to this four-year period, the 
                                                 
18
 The direction of this bias is unknown, depending as it does on the sign of the spillovers. If, for 
example, neighboring municipalities also benefit from the highway, comparing municipalities gaining 
direct access to a highway with other nearby municipalities would bias the coefficient downwards. 
See, e.g., Boarnet (1997) for evidence on the spillover effect of highway investment.  
19
 This information was obtained in conversation with experts in the implementation of highway 
construction projects. This was followed up by an internet search monitoring the evolution in a 
number of major highway projects during the period analyzed (i.e., several segments of highways A-
66, ‘Autovía de La Plata’ and A-23 Zaragoza-Teruel). We examined the Memoranda of the Spanish 
Ministry of Public Works, press information about tenders, etc. Our research showed that the timing 
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government might already have undertaken some work in relation to the highway segment, 
including, for example, drafting various projects, conducting environmental evaluations, 
including proposals in road planning documents, etc. This preliminary period could extend 
from between one or two years in the case of projects that are added to the political agenda by 
surprise to decades in the case of projects that lost their initial support because of changes in 
political priorities or the lack of resources
20
.  
Insert Figure 5 
The point we wish to emphasize is that, even if it is true that local government will 
probably be aware of the project from the outset, the reaction to a new highway only begins 
when that local government really believes that the construction of the road will go ahead. So, 
although we expect local governments to act in anticipation of the completion of the road, we 
consider that this reaction will perhaps only start once the project has been included in the 
budget and, primarily, once the tendering process is complete. At this juncture, the local 
government can reasonably expect the highway segment to be built and that it will be 
completed in a period of around four years. This means that for projects completed during the 
period 2003-2007 (which in fact coincided with a local term-of-office), it is reasonable to 
expect that it was the local incumbent during the previous term (i.e., 1999-2003) that actually 
started to consider the possibility of amending the master plan in order to convert land from 
rural to urban uses. Figure 5 illustrates the timing of our treatment: the treatment period 
(labeled after treatment) covers the period 1999-2007, and is divided into two sub-periods, 
1999-2003 when the project was presumably started, and 2003-2007 which is when we know 
that the project was completed. The period 1995-1999 is the period before treatment: the year 
1995 is our initial period, used as the baseline for comparisons of the evolution of the 
outcome variables and also to measure pre-treatment municipal characteristics; the year 1999 
is reserved to perform a validity test, since we do not expect the treatment to have any effect 
on the outcomes for 1999. 
3.3. Matching 
By restricting the sample to those municipalities with prior access to a main road we ensure 
that the treated units (those gaining access to a new highway) and the control units (the 
remaining municipalities) are more comparable. Note, however, that only a modest fraction 
                                                                                                                                                        
described here matched well with that of the cases studies. Detailed information is available upon 
request.  
20 In fact, such delays may also occur (albeit to a lesser extent) in the budgeting phase, thus delaying 
the tendering process (see Bel, 2010, and Caamaño and Lago, 2012, for evidence on delays in the 
execution of infrastructure budgets in Spain). 
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of the municipalities with prior access to a main road gained new access to a highway during 
the period. This suggests that these municipalities should still differ from those that did not 
receive the treatment. One possible way of dealing with these differences is to control for 
other factors that might have a simultaneous effect on highway location and on local land use 
policies. However, it is well-known that the ability of regression analyses to adjust for 
differences in observed covariates is severely reduced when the between-group differences in 
these covariates are substantial (e.g., Rubin, 2001; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009), as is 
probably the case here. In this situation, using matching methods to balance the distribution 
of the covariates of the two subsamples helps reduce the bias of the estimates. The goal is to 
compare cases where all other causal variables are as similar as possible, so that any 
difference between cases can be attributed to the treatment (see, e.g., Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1985). Matching is the observational study analog of randomization in ideal experiments (see, 
Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983, and Rubin and Thomas, 2000), although less complete as it can 
only balance the distribution of observed covariates. A further advantage of matching is its 
complete transparency. The matching algorithm is applied before the estimation of the 
treatment so as to balance the covariates of the two groups as much as possible. This ensures 
that the choices made by the researcher at this stage are not contaminated by the knowledge 
of how the choice of the covariates impacts the results obtained. As Ho et al. (2007) note, by 
using matching researchers are forced to specify a priori the research design they are going to 
use. 
 In this paper we use propensity score matching to select a subset of the municipalities 
with prior access to a main road that are most similar to those gaining access to a new 
highway. We then adhere to the recommendation of Ho et al. (2007) and estimate a 
parametric model with the data of our final matched sample. Other authors, such as Rubin 
(2001) and Crump et al. (2009),  also recommend this procedure, suggesting that the 
propensity score be used only for systematic sample selection as a precursor to regression 
estimation (or to more complex parametric methods). In most studies using matching 
techniques, the analysis performed to obtain the treatment effect is a simple difference in 
means (or the equivalent to a bivariate regression between the treatment indicator and the 
outcome, in the parametric case). However, it is well-known that if the matching is not exact, 
the procedure can be improved by adjusting for covariates. There are several ways of 
performing this adjustment non-parametrically (Rubin, 2001; Dehejia and Wahba, 1999; 
Abadie and Imbens, 2006 and 2011), but the obvious way is simply to run a multivariate 
regression using the matched sample and the covariates employed in the estimation of the 
propensity score. Ho et al. (2007) recommend this procedure and suggest treating the 
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predetermined covariates as fixed, meaning that standard errors and confidence intervals 
should be computed as in a normal regression framework
21
.  
Matched sample. We constructed the matched sample using the ‘propensity score’. We 
estimated a logit model, using as the dependent variable a dummy equal to one if the 
municipality gained access to a new highway during the period 2003-2007 (and zero 
otherwise) and as regressors variables deemed to have an influence on both the location of 
the new highway segment and on the conversion of land from rural to urban uses. The 
‘propensity score’ was then computed and control municipalities were matched to their 
treated counterparts based on presenting a similar ‘propensity score’22. The method used was 
the ‘nearest neighbor matching with replacement’, whereby a given control unit can be 
matched to more than one treatment unit, which increases the average quality of matching 
and reduces the bias.  
Matching variables. As explained above, the matching strategy builds on the 
‘unconfoundedness’ or ‘conditional independence’ assumption, requiring that the outcome 
variable (i.e., land conversion) be independent of treatment (i.e., highway placement) 
conditional on the ‘propensity score’. Hence, implementing the matching procedure requires 
choosing a set of variables that credibly satisfy this condition. Only variables that 
simultaneously influence the treatment decision and the outcome variable should be included. 
Obviously, in order to avoid interference with the treatment, these variables should be 
measured prior to the treatment; in our case, the variables were measured circa 1995 (see 
Table A.1 in the Appendix).  
The variables used to estimate the logit equation can be classified into the following 
groups. First, we include a set of demand variables, on the grounds that in places where there 
is more demand for building we would expect there to be more land conversion and a greater 
government response in providing the required infrastructure. In this group we include the 
following variables (see Table A.1 in the Appendix for precise definitions): log(Urban area 
population), Major urban area dummy, log(Population) and log(Unemployment). All these 
variables have been previously reported to be key determinants of land use decisions (Solé-
Ollé and Viladecans-Marsal, 2012) and highway location (Holl, 2011)
23
. Second, we include a 
                                                 
21
 In some types of matching, the parametric analysis might require some adjustment. For instance, 
when using ‘matching with replacement’, weights must be used to ensure that the parametric analysis 
reflects the actual observations (see Ho et al., 2005; and Dehejia and Wahba, 1999). 
22
 Just six municipalities fell outside the common support. We performed a robustness check by 
excluding them from the analysis, and the results did not change. 
23
 The unemployment variable might also have an impact on highway placement given the high 
redistributive bias of Spanish infrastructure construction (see Solé-Ollé, 2013). 
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set of variables measuring the geographical constraints on both development and highway 
building: log(Open land), log(Area’s open land), log(Ruggedness), log(Area’s ruggedness), 
and % Vacant land. In places with large tracts of open land there is more room for 
development and mapping out the highway route can also be expected to be easier. 
Municipalities surrounded by other municipalities with huge amounts of available open land 
will probably see how both the location of the highway and the new development occur in 
neighboring municipalities. Places with poor topography are less likely to gain direct access 
to a highway and are more likely to be less developed. Places with large tracts of vacant land 
at the outset do not need to convert that much land from rural to urban uses as land is already 
available for development and, as land is ready to build, the changes of getting highway 
access are also probably larger.  
The list of potential variables to include is longer but, following Ho et al. (2007), we opt 
for a parsimonious specification where all the variables used are statistically significant and 
help to predict the outcome of interest. The use of this parsimonious specification produced a 
good balance of covariates and good matches. Nevertheless, we also tried some additional 
specifications. We added the following demand variables: Beach and Coastal dummies, 
Tourist specialization
24
, and Employment density and Predicted Employment growth
25
. These 
variables did not add much explanatory capacity to the model and in none of the cases was the 
t-statistic greater than one. We also tried a specification whereby we added some variables 
that might be assumed as being correlated with preferences for/against development. These 
were %Homeowners, %Commuters, Right-wing government dummy, and Majority 
government dummy. None of these variables had a discernible impact on the probability of 
gaining highways access, and so were not included in the final specification.  
Note also that some of the variables included in the logit are measured at the 
municipality level, while others are measured at the ‘local labor market’ level, it not being 
clear which is the best choice. On the one hand, given that highways constitute network 
infrastructures it seems to make sense to consider the traits of the surrounding area. On the 
other hand, the decision might be taken to include all the variables measured at both levels. In 
some cases, however, this generates too much noise, given the high spatial correlation of the 
                                                 
24
 Improving accessibility to tourist areas (and, hence, to beaches) seems to have been a relevant driver 
of highway location until the mid-1990s (see Holl, 2004). Note, however, that only a few of the new 
highway segments built between 2003 and 2007 link up to the coast (Figures 2 and 4).  
25
 In fact, these last two variables had a negative (although not statistically significant) impact on the 
probability of gaining access to a new highway, and the effect disappeared when controlling for the 
level of unemployment. In Spain, therefore, it seems the goal of helping lagged regions is granted 
greater importance than more efficiency-oriented motives in the location of highway projects (see 
Solé-Ollé, 2013). 
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variables (the case of unemployment, for example), so we opted to retain only those variables 
that gave the best performance. (Note that in the case of population, open area, and 
ruggedness, we included the variables measured at both levels of aggregation)
26
.  
Finally, we also include a set of political variables. Here, we consider that the main 
political determinant of the probability of a municipality gaining highway access is the 
partisan alignment between the mayor and the regional president and/or the central 
government (see Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro, 2008). Since during most of the period 
(1996-2004) the party in power at the central level was the right-wing ‘Partido Popular’ (PP 
from now on), we included in the equation a set of variables that measures the possible 
combinations of having a regional president belonging to the PP and a mayor that does or 
does not belong to this party. Moreover, in the case of the regional government we also 
allowed for the possibility that the PP had been in control of the region for most of the time or 
alternatively that the control of the region had swung back and forth from the PP to the PSOE 
(the left-wing ‘Partido Socialista Obrero Español’). Using a series of F-tests we reduced the 
number of political variables to just two. The two political categories that actually added 
some explanatory power to the equation were the interaction between being a regional PP 
stronghold (i.e., Core PP dummy) and having a mayor that did not belong to this party (i.e., 
Unaligned mayor dummy) and the interaction between being in a region that periodically 
swung from PSOE to PP control or vice-versa (i.e., Swing PP dummy) and having a PP mayor 
(i.e., Aligned mayor dummy).  
Validation. Using the aforementioned variables we are able to balance the covariates in 
the two subsamples (see Table A.2 for the results of the logit estimation). We performed 
several tests to determine whether or not we achieved a good matching. First, we performed a 
comparison of means between treated and control units in the unmatched and matched 
samples (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). These tests are shown in Table A.3 in the 
Appendix. In the unmatched sample, the treated group (the municipalities gaining highway 
access) are disproportionately located in major urban areas or in ‘local labor markets’ with 
larger populations, have more vacant land and less open land (both in the municipality and in 
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 Some papers suggest that in these cases matching could adopt a multilevel approach. The problem 
with this, however, is that the spatial correlation is quite high for some variables. This means that 
using two levels (i.e., municipality and ‘local labor market’) does not improve the model’s explanatory 
capacity. We therefore opted for a more practical solution: selecting the level of each variable that 
improves the explanatory capacity of the model. Some papers (see, e.g., Arpino and Mealli, 2011) 
even suggest using fixed effects for higher layers of aggregation (e.g., region, ‘local labor market’). 
This was not an option in our case, given the reduced number of observations for some of these higher 
units.  
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neighboring areas), the terrain is less rugged (also both in the municipality and in the 
immediate area) and are also more politically appealing. In the matched sample, none of the 
differences in means between the treated and the control group are statistically significant. 
Second, we also examined standardized bias both before and after matching; before matching, 
many variables presented a bias greater than 20%, which is the level above which some 
authors suggest linear regression coefficients risk being highly biased (see Imbens and 
Wooldridge, 2009). After matching, all the variables presented a bias below this level and the 
reduction in % bias was substantial (in the order of between 60 and 90% in most cases)
27
. 
Third, we also re-estimated the propensity score on the matched sample and compared the 
pseudo-R2s before and after matching, which were actually 0.360 and 0.029, respectively. LR 
tests of joint significance of the regressors before and after the matching presented values of 
162.12 and 6.54, with p-values of 0.000 and 0.886, respectively. All these tests suggest that 
matching was quite successful in balancing the sample.  
3.4. Estimated equation 
We estimate the effect of receiving the treatment during the period that extends from year t0 
(before treatment) to some year in the future t (after treatment) on the growth in the outcome 
variable between these two moments in time. The treatment variable is denoted by hi and is 
a dummy equal to one if municipality i gained access to a new highway during the period, and 
zero otherwise. The estimation is performed separately with the samples containing each of 
the two control groups identified in the previous sections: either the municipalities with prior 
access to a main road, or a subset of these municipalities selected using matching techniques. 
Our main outcome variable is the increase in developable land during this period 
measured relative to developed land at the beginning of the period (see section two). Recall 
that we denote this variable by di,t-t0. We estimate the following equation: 
                                                t,i
'
t,iitt,i  hd    010 z                                          (1) 
where zi,t0 is a vector of municipal characteristics either time-invariant or measured before 
treatment, and i,t is an error term with the usual properties. The variables included in zi,0 are 
the same as those used in the selection of the matched sample. The inclusion of these controls 
is not strictly necessary in the case of the matched sample but, as shown in Abadie and 
Imbens (2006 and 2011), covariates might help reduce the bias in the estimation if matching 
is not perfect.  
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 Note also that the average bias was 39.2% before the matching and just 4% after.  
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The before-after analysis allows us to eliminate any time-invariant factors that may have 
an influence on the decision to convert land from rural to urban uses and on the decision to 
build a highway in a given place. Clearly, there might be time-invariant omitted factors which 
are simultaneously correlated with di,t-t0 and hi. We deal with this problem by assuming 
unconfoundedness given lagged policy outcomes and other pre-treatment variables (see 
Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009)
28
. So, we include in the zi,0 a measure of the percentage of 
vacant land at the beginning of the period vi,t0. Recall from section two that di,t-0 =vi,t0. 
Vacant land is defined as land that has been classified in the past as developable but that has 
yet to be developed (see section two). Clearly, the decision to increase the amount of 
developable land is strongly affected by the amount of developable land already available in 
the municipality (see Solé-Ollé and Viladecans-Marsal, 2012).  
One way of assessing the validity of the unconfoundedness assumption is to estimate the 
causal effect of the treatment on a variable known to be unaffected by it, typically because its 
value is determined prior to the treatment itself (see Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). The most 
interesting case is to consider the treatment effect on a lagged outcome. If this effect is not 
zero then the treated observations can be assumed to be distinct from the controls. If, 
however, the treatment effect is zero, it is more plausible that the unconfoundedness 
assumption holds. To implement the test, the vector of covariates has to be split in two 
groups, separating a pseudo-outcome from the other variables. Here, our pseudo-outcome is 
the increase in developable land from 1995 (the initial period) to 1999 (the year before the 
beginning of the treatment period). When testing for the treatment effects on the increase in 
developable land during the period 1995-1999 we also control for pre-treatment covariates, 
including the amount of vacant land in 1995. The test thus considers the differences in the 
amount of developable land in 1999 for municipalities that are already similar with respect to 
their amount of vacant land in 1995. Actually, this test can be implemented together with the 
estimation of the treatment effects for the period after the treatment. The estimated equation is 
as follows: 
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 There is some discussion in the literature regarding the advantages and drawbacks of controlling for 
lagged outcomes in a before-after analysis. Estimating equation (1) without conditioning for lagged 
outcomes is what a traditional ‘difference-in-differences’ analysis does. The specification that adds the 
lagged outcome is referred to as the ‘uncounfoundedness-based’ approach. Imbens and Wooldrige 
(2009) conclude that “the ‘DiD’ approach appears less attractive than the unconfoundedness-based 
approach in the context of panel data. It is difficult to see how making treated and control units 
comparable on lagged outcomes will make the causal interpretation of their difference less credible as 
suggested by the DiD assumptions” (p.68). The use of lagged outcomes in matching analysis is also 
very common (see Blundell and Costa, 2008). 
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Here, we pool three cross-sections of data, corresponding to the periods 1995-1999, 
1995-2003, and 1995-2007. The dummy after is equal to one for those periods ending in a 
year in which we expect new highways to have an effect (i.e., 2003 and 2007) and zero for the 
period 1995-1999, and t  are period fixed-effects. A test of whether 1 is equal to zero allows 
us to assess the uncounfoundedness assumption: conditional on zi,t0, the effect of hi on 
di,1995-1999  should be zero. The parameter 1 is the treatment effect in which we are 
interested. In fact, since the effect of the highway might change over time (recall that we do 
not know for certain whether municipalities are able to anticipate fully the effect of the 
highway during the term-of-office prior to the completion of the infrastructure), it is 
convenient to allow for different effects in the two treatment sub-periods (i.e., those ending in 
2003 and 2007). This is the equation we estimate to obtain these period-specific effects: 
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where started is a dummy equal to one for the period ending in 2003 and completed is a 
dummy equal to one for the period ending in 2007. Equations (2) and (3) are estimated by 
OLS with standard errors clustered at the municipality level.  
Finally, in order to allow for heterogeneous effects, equation (2) is re-estimated 
allowing the treatment to be different in the two different regimes:  
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where )( xxd i   and )( xxd i   are two dummies equal to one if the value of a given variable 
is lower/higher than a given threshold (usually the median of the distribution)
29
. The variable 
x is also a pre-determined variable but may or may not be one of the variables included in the 
vector zi,t0.  The interacted variables measure: (i) the strength of the demand shock, (ii) 
geographical impediments to building, (iii) the amount of vacant land at the outset, and (iv) 
the preferences of locals for/against development. Many papers have shown that these 
variables are drivers of decisions regarding land use regulations (see, e.g., Sáiz, 2010, on the 
                                                 
29Not all the potential covariates were eventually included in the logit used to estimate the ‘propensity 
score’. Where one of the x variables was not included in the zi,t0. vector, we added the dummy as a 
control in the estimation. Similarly, a more flexible estimation would involve allowing the 1  
coefficients to vary between the two regimes. 
 23 
effect of topography, Solé-Ollé and Viladecans, 2012, on the effects of the amount of vacant 
land, and Kahn, 2011, Hilber and Robert-Nicoud, 2012, and Solé-Ollé and Viladecans, 2012, 
on the preferences of residents). What is less evident, however, is that these drivers also affect 
the size of the impact of a highway on land use decisions. In Appendix A we outline a simple 
theoretical model that is capable of predicting these interaction effects. This model suggests 
that (under some mild assumptions) the effect of a new highway access on land conversion 
should be stronger: the stronger is the demand for building in the municipality, the easier it is 
to build out (e.g., the less rugged is the terrain), the lower the amount of vacant land at the 
outset, and also the less opposed to development locals are. 
4. Results 
Main results. Table 3 presents the results obtained when estimating equations (2) and (3). In 
panel (a) we estimate the overall effect of new highways (equation (2)) throughout the whole 
treatment period (identified via the after dummy). In panel (b) we provide more detailed 
information regarding the effect of new highways over time (i.e., started and completed 
dummies, which refer to the period 1999-2003 and 2003-2007, respectively). Columns (i) and 
(ii) report estimates for the sample of municipalities with prior access to a main road. In 
columns (iii) and (iv) we report estimates using the matched sample. Columns (i) and (iii) 
report the results without covariates (with just the year fixed effects) and columns (ii) and (iv) 
add the full set of controls to the equation. 
Insert Table 3 and Figure 6 
The average effects of highway construction throughout the whole treatment period (the 
coefficient for the interaction between the hi and afteri dummies) are positive and 
statistically significant. However, the effect is greater when using the matched sample. For 
example, the results in column (iv) indicate that a municipality gaining access to a new 
highway experiences an extra increase (i.e., with respect to a similar municipality not 
obtaining such access) in the amount of developable land of around 89% of the initial size of 
the city (i.e., of the amount of developed land in 1995). This is, indeed, a particularly large 
effect, being twice as great as the effect obtained when using the whole sample (see column 
(ii)). Panel (b) of Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients for the interactions between the 
hi and the startedi and completedi dummies and, thus, allows for different effects to occur in 
the 1999-2003 and 2003-2007 periods. The results in columns (iii) and (iv) (corresponding to 
the matched sample) suggest that most of the effects occurred during the first municipal term-
of-office (period 1999-2003). The estimated treatment effect by 2003 is around 70%, rising to 
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around 100% by 2007. However, a simple test of equality of coefficients (bottom of panel (b)) 
is unable to reject that these two numbers are equal. The results are qualitatively similar when 
using the whole sample (columns (i) and (ii)), although here the effect is not statistically 
significant during the first period. In any case, however, the test of equality of coefficients 
cannot reject that these two numbers are also equal in this case. 
These results are also illustrated in Figure 6. In this figure we plot the evolution of the 
amount of developable land, which is simply the summation of the starting amount of vacant 
land (as of 1995) and the (estimated) increase in developable land. The coefficients used to 
draw this graph are taken from column (iii) of Table 3. The plot shows how the evolution of 
the amount of developable land in the treated and control municipalities diverged during the 
periods 1999-2003 and 2003-2007. It is quite clear that there is a differential trend and that 
this trend does not differ much in the two treatment periods. The graph also emphasizes that 
the level reached in 2007 is higher than that in 2003; however, the confidence intervals are 
too wide for us to be able to discard the possibility that these two numbers are equal.  
A possible concern regarding these results is that they might simply be picking up the 
fact that places benefiting from highway construction are just different from other locations 
(i.e., they tended to grow more during the period and they had a higher probability of 
obtaining highways because of this). Yet, note that the results in Table 3 also provide the 
information needed to test the ‘uncounfoundedness’ assumption. The coefficient estimated for 
hi is not statistically different from zero, suggesting that localities that gained access to a 
main highway and those that did not grew no differently during the period 1995-1999. Note 
also that in the matched sample (i.e., columns (iii) and (iv)) treated and control municipalities 
are identical with respect to their respective amounts of vacant land in 1995 (a fact that is 
confirmed by the equality of means tests presented in Table A.2 in the Appendix). This means 
that municipalities that were equal with respect to lagged outcomes (i.e., vacant land in 1995) 
also experienced growth of a similar magnitude during the following period, which preceded 
the construction of the highway. This is clearly illustrated in Figure 6 with the amount of 
developable land in the two groups virtually overlapping during the pre-treatment period 
(1995 and 1999) and diverging in the treatment period (2003 and 2007). Yet, it should be 
noted that the pre-treatment period was not one of complete inactivity as regards land use 
policies. In both groups there was a substantial amount of land being converted from rural to 
urban uses (see also Table 1 in section 2) and in the case of the control group the trend in the 
amount of developable land was virtually the same before and after 1999.  
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Interaction effects. Table 4 shows the results of the estimation of equation (4) –i.e., 
when we allow the effect to differ between groups of municipalities. The aim of this analysis 
is to test whether highways have a larger impact on land use policies in certain municipalities 
than they do in others. In Appendix A we illustrate this possibility by means of a simple 
theoretical model. Our model predicts that the impact of the highway will be greater in places 
facing larger demand shocks. In order to test this hypothesis we split our sample in two: 
municipalities located in urban areas with urban population over/below the median. We chose 
Urban area population (in fact, it is the population in the ‘local labour market’) as this is one 
of the variables with most explanatory power in the logit and also because it is statistically 
significant in the land conversion equation (although these results are not shown here for 
reasons of space). The model also predicts that the effects of the highway will decrease the 
more difficult it is to build. Here we use two variables: terrain Ruggedness (see Sáiz, 2010) 
and the availability of Open space (note that both variables presented a statistically significant 
impact both in the treatment and in the land conversion equations). In these two cases we also 
split the sample in two: values of each variable above/below the median. Likewise, the model 
predicts that the increase in the amount of developable land from a base period will be lower, 
the greater the amount of vacant land that is available at the outset. Once again, vacant land is 
a significant determinant of land conversion (see also Solé-Ollé and Viladecans, 2012) and 
was included in the final logit specification. Additionally, we split the sample into 
municipalities with high and low values of a further two variables plausibly correlated with 
the preferences of local residents in favor of/opposed to  development: %Homeowners and 
%Commuters. Both groups are assumed to be opposed to development, homeowners because 
they believe development will depress the value of their property (see, e.g, Fischel, 2001, 
Ortalo-Magne and Prat, 2011, Dehring et al., 2008; Hilber and Robert-Nicoud, 2013) and 
commuters because they work outside the community and so do not benefit from improved 
job prospects in town. Finally, the model also predicts that the effect of a highway on land 
conversion will be greater the more pro-growth is the ideology of the local government and/or 
the higher is the influence wielded by developers (see Solé-Ollé and Viladecans, 2012 and 
2013). To take these predictions into account, we also split our sample into municipalities 
controlled by right-wing vs. left-wing governments (i.e., the interacting variable is the Right-
wing dummy, see Table A.1 for a complete definition) and also into municipalities governed 
by a majority government (i.e., Majority dummy) vs. municipalities governed by a coalition 
or minority government. We expect right-wing and majority mayors to be more responsive to 
the enhanced demand for building created by a new highway and, therefore, to convert more 
land from rural to urban uses.  
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Insert Table 4 
The results in Table 4 confirm most of these predictions. Panel (a) reports the results 
when the sample was split according to demand and supply variables, and panel (b) reports 
the results when it was split in relation to preferences for or against development. In each 
column we report the coefficient estimated for each of the regimes, with High and Low in 
most cases indicating whether the variable is above/below the sample median. However, 
when the variable used to split the sample is a dummy (i.e., Right-wing or Majority), High 
and Low indicate whether the dummy is equal to one or zero, respectively. At the bottom of 
the panel we report, for each of the variables, a test of the equality of coefficients in the two 
regimes. The results show, first, that the effect of a highway on land conversion was restricted 
mainly to the sample of municipalities located in the most populated areas. In this case the 
treatment effect was approximately 100% of the initial city size vs. just 23% in the case of 
municipalities located in less dense ‘local labor markets’. Moreover, the difference between 
the two regimes was statistically significant, and the coefficient of the low populated areas 
was not statistically different from zero. This result is consistent with findings in the literature 
that also show that the positive effects of highways are only recorded in areas that are in close 
proximity to urban areas (see, e.g., Rephann and Isserman, 1994). Second, the results also 
show that the effects of a new highway are restricted to municipalities with a substantial 
amount of open land and whose topography is favorable. In this last case, for example, the 
treatment effect in rugged areas is approximately 50% of the initial size of the city, while in 
places with a more favorable topography the effect is around 120% of the initial city size. The 
two coefficients are statistically different from each other at the 95% level. Third, the effect of 
the highway on land conversion is statistically zero in places with a high amount of vacant 
land at the outset. In such places there was no need to designate more land for development, 
since there was already sufficient land classified in this category in 1995. By contrast, in 
places with little vacant land the effect of the new highway was around 100% of the initial 
city size and statistically significant at the 95% level. These results suggest that, as expected, 
the effect of the construction of a new highway on land use policies is restricted to places with 
high demand and good topography, and where the supply of developable land was restricted 
before the demand shock. 
In the first two columns of panel (b) we show how the effect of a new highway is also 
greater in places with a low proportion of homeowners and commuters. This impact is much 
more apparent in the case of commuters: in places with few commuters, the treatment effect 
was around 110% of the initial city size, while in places with a high proportion of commuters 
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the effect was around 36%. Both coefficients are statistically significant (although the second 
one only at the 90% level), while the difference between the two coefficients is also 
significant (also at the 90% level). The difference between places with a low and a high 
percentage of homeowners is smaller and not statistically significant. Finally, in the last two 
columns of panel (b) we show the estimated coefficients for right-wing vs. left-wing 
governments and for majority vs. other types of government. The results are striking in both 
cases: the effect of a new highway on land conversion is much greater if the municipality is 
run by a right-wing mayor: 120% vs. 50%. Both coefficients are statistically significant, as is 
the difference between the two (at the 90% level). The difference is even greater in the case of 
majority governments: the treatment effect in this case is 130% (vs. 34% for a coalition or 
minority government). The difference between these two coefficients is statistically 
significant at the 99% level. The results suggest, therefore, that the preferences of the local 
community matter. Land use policies will follow highway construction to a lesser extent in 
places where the residents disapprove of development (i.e., municipalities with a large 
proportion of homeowners and/or commuters), in places where the mayor belongs to a party 
known to have an ideology that does not favor development (i.e., where the mayor belongs to 
a left-wing party), or where the mayor is more constrained by electoral considerations (i.e., 
the mayor governs without a majority).  
Admittedly, however, these heterogeneous results need to be treated with extreme 
caution. Even if we had identified a causal effect in each of the subsamples, it would be 
difficult to attribute a causal difference in the treatment effect solely to the variable used in 
splitting the sample. Any of these variables might be correlated with other factors that have 
not been taken into account, and some of these factors have also been used for splitting the 
sample. For example, municipalities in urban areas also have less open space available and 
are places built on less rugged terrain. This means that it is difficult to determine which of 
these three variables is driving the results – it might be just one of them, two or all of them. A 
similar situation arises with the initial amount of vacant land available and the right-wing 
dummy, which are also positively correlated. To dissipate some of these doubts we might 
stress that the correlations between all the variables used to split the sample are quite low, 
most being less than 10%. The largest correlation coefficients are around 20% (precisely in 
the two examples cited above). In order to check whether this might be a problem for our 
results we re-estimated each of the interaction regressions adding as extra interactions those 
between hi afteri and the other interacted variables that presented the strongest correlation 
with the one under analysis (e.g., in the case of vacant land, the right-wing dummy, and vice 
versa). In all cases, the results regarding the interaction effect for the original variable did not 
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change greatly
30
. This suggests that the results shown in Table 4 are substantive and not 
driven by the omission of other variables that are also interacting with the treatment. 
Building activity. The response of Spanish municipalities to the building of a new 
segment of highway, with the conversion of vast tracts of land from rural to urban uses, seems 
remarkable both in terms of quantity and speed. However, it remains unclear as to whether the 
response ultimately had an impact on real estate outcomes. Primarily, we are not in a position 
to determine whether the municipalities that expand their developable land most can 
accurately forecast demand for building in the municipality. It might be that they designate 
greater amounts of land for development in the hope that construction will occur at some 
point in the future if the land is available to be built upon. Therefore, it is important that we 
consider the effects of the construction of a new highway on real estate outcomes, including, 
for example, the amount of developed land and the number of housing units built. These 
considerations are undertaken in Table 5. Panel (a) presents the treatment effect over the 
whole after period and panel (b) differentiates between sub-periods. Columns (i) and (ii) 
present the results for the increase in the amount of Developed land and columns (iii) and (iv) 
for the increase in the number of Housing units. Columns (i) and (iii) use the whole sample 
(controls being municipalities with prior access to a main road) and columns (ii) and (iv) use 
the matched sample.   
Insert Table 5 
The results show that gaining access to a new highway also has an effect on the two 
specific real estate outcomes considered. The average treatment effect is 52% in the case of 
developed land. This means that, while a new highway provokes an 89% expansion of the 
‘potential’ size of the city (i.e., the increase in the amount of developable land), the real 
expansion of the city was much lower
31
. This divergence can probably be attributed to time 
lags in the development process: as many municipalities did not dispose of sufficient vacant 
land at the beginning of the period (recall that these are precisely the ones that converted most 
land), they need time (in fact, one term-of-office) to modify the planning documents to permit 
more development to be undertaken. Although a number of development projects had already 
been started in the first period, others had to wait until the second term to be initiated and then 
several years were needed before these projects were completed. Panel (b) of Table 5 
                                                 
30
 For reasons of space, the results are not shown in the paper, but are available upon request. We also 
add to the equation interactions between the x’s and hi and also with the year fixed effects. The 
results were also qualitatively unchanged. 
31
 Recall that we can compare those two variables precisely because they have been measured with 
respect to the same denominator, the initial amount of developed land. 
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confirms this intuition. In this case, the coefficient for the second period (on the interaction 
between hi and completedi) is much higher than that for the first period (on the interaction 
between hi and startedi). Moreover, the coefficient for the first period is not statistically 
significant and the equality of the two coefficients can be rejected at the 90% level (see 
column (ii)). Note that this result differs from that obtained in the case of developable land in 
Table 3: in that case we were unable to reject the hypothesis that the increase in the amount of 
developable land occurred mainly in the first period.  
This impression is confirmed when we consider the growth in the number of housing 
units. Here the point estimate for the first period is not only statistically insignificant but it is 
nearly zero. The effect in the second period is much higher: the new highway caused the 
housing stock to grow by 13%. Note that this effect is much lower than that for the amount of 
developable land. As explained in section two, this might be due to the fact that the type of 
development experienced in Spain during these years was extremely land-intensive. Vast 
tracts of land were allocated to commercial and industrial uses and employed for the 
construction of parking lots and the housing of infrastructure. Likewise, residential density 
fell considerably. Unfortunately, the data currently available do not allow us to investigate 
these possibilities in any further detail.  
Insert Figures 7 & 8 
Figures 7 and 8 show the evolution of the amount of developed land and of the number 
of housing units over the period for the treated and control municipalities. If we compare 
them with Figure 6 (which did the same for the amount of developable land), these two 
figures clearly show that, while the evolution of treated and control units began to diverge 
after 1999, the difference between the two groups was not substantial before 2007. 
Spillover effects. The above results show that the impact of a new highway access on a 
municipality in which the highway segment is built can be substantial. However, as the spatial 
area of such a municipality is quite small, it would be reasonable to expect that a new 
highway would also have an impact on neighboring municipalities. In this section we examine 
the effects of the highway on municipalities belonging to the same ‘local labor market’ as that 
of the municipality gaining direct access to the highway. We use the same sample, and the 
treated and control units are unchanged. However, we are concerned with a different outcome: 
for each of the municipalities in the sample therefore we define a new variable, namely, the 
value of the outcome (i.e., the increase in the amount of developable land) in the other 
municipalities belonging to the same ‘local labor market’. In Table 6 we show the results for 
all three outcome variables when focusing on the rest of the municipalities in the ‘local labor 
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market’ as well as the results for the whole area. Columns (i) and (ii) show the results for 
developable land. Column (ii) indicates that the size of the treatment effect on these other 
municipalities is much smaller (i.e., 17% of the initial size of the city) than that on the 
municipality gaining direct access to the highway (89%, see Table 3). A further difference 
becomes apparent – the effect is also more clearly split between the two sub-periods. The 
increase in the amount of developable land is around 14% by 2003 and 27% by 2007. The 
hypothesis that these two coefficients are equal can be rejected at the 90% level. In the case of 
developed land, the effect in the neighboring municipalities is also smaller than in the central 
municipality (i.e., 19% vs. 61% in 2007). The timing of the effect is unchanged: development 
occurred mainly in the second sub-period. 
Insert Table 6 
In the case of housing units, however, the effect is greater in the neighboring 
municipalities (i.e., 17% vs. 13% in 2007). This might be attributed to the tendency for 
industrial and commercial land uses (which we suspect represent a very large percentage of 
the increase in land consumption over the period) to concentrate near the highway, while 
residential development is more evenly distributed in space tending perhaps to avoid the 
places where other land uses concentrate. Unfortunately, a lack of detailed information about 
land uses mans this claim cannot be assessed. 
All in all, the conclusion that can be derived from the analysis is that the construction of 
a new highway segment has a huge impact on the municipalities gaining direct access to it. 
This effect, moreover, extends to other municipalities in the same ‘local labor market’, but the 
effect diminishes with distance from the highway. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we have analyzed whether Spanish local governments modify their land use 
policies in response to an increase in demand for building generated by a new highway. Our 
results show that this is the case, at least during the period 1999-2007. The increase in the 
amount of land designated for development during this period was twice as high in 
municipalities gaining access to a new highway than it was in other municipalities. The 
results also show that this effect occurred during the early years, coinciding with the initiation 
of the highway project. This suggests that municipalities are able to anticipate the effects of a 
highway on housing demand, so ensuring that there will be sufficient land to start the 
projected developments at a later date. The impact of the highways also extended to real 
estate outcomes including, for example, the amount of developed land and the number of 
housing units. The impact on these two outcomes was smaller than it was for the developable 
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land, and occurred mostly during the second half of the period. We interpret this as being due 
to the lengthy process of converting land from rural to urban uses, which usually takes a 
whole term-of-office. In municipalities without sufficient vacant land at the outset, 
development projects have to wait until the planning documents have been modified. This 
interpretation is reinforced by a number of additional results indicating that the municipalities 
with little vacant land initially are those that convert most land from rural to urban uses. 
Overall, these results suggest that, while local land use policies appear to adapt to market 
forces quite rapidly, the time required to amend planning documents and implement the 
changes may contribute to delays in the completion of development projects. However, 
without access to municipal-level housing price data we are not really in a position to assess 
whether this has been a particular problem in Spain. 
Our results also show that the reaction of Spanish local governments to the housing 
demand shock created by a new highway is highly heterogeneous. It appears that only those 
municipalities located in a large enough ‘local labor market’ opt to increase the amount of 
developable land to any substantial degree. This might simply be because the housing demand 
shock that we have assumed does not actually manifest itself in the more rural areas; these 
local councils might not perceive that the highway will increase building activity that much 
and so they take no immediate steps to modify the existing planning document. This 
conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that the impact of a new highway on land 
development and housing construction is much lower in less urbanized areas. Places with a 
shortage of open spaces and with a very rugged topography also seem to react less to the 
opening up of a highway section. As discussed, these results are in line with the literature. 
However, we offer some novel results and some findings that are often overlooked: for 
example, local government reaction to a new highway (as well as its eventual impact on real 
estate outcomes) is also much less evident in places where the locals (residents or their 
political representatives) are opposed to development. More specifically, we find that places 
with a high proportion of homeowners and commuters tend to convert less land from rural to 
urban uses following the construction of a highway. By contrast, municipalities with a right-
wing mayor (an ideology that has been documented as being favorable to development in 
Spain) and with a majority government (which can afford to cater more to developers’ than to 
voters’ interests) increase the land designated for development much more than is the case of 
other municipalities gaining access to a new highway. 
Overall, our study depicts a fairly mixed scene. On the one hand, market forces had an 
enormous influence over the use of land, this despite the fact that Spain’s land use regulations 
are strongly interventionist. The huge increase in the amount of land designated for 
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development during the last housing boom, especially in places experiencing an above 
average shock (i.e., in places gaining access to a highway), is clear evidence that these 
regulations did not represent a complete impediment to development at the aggregate level. 
On the other hand, however, the need to adapt these regulations to the new conditions may 
have led to some delays in the development process. Moreover, in certain places the 
regulations might have prevented the eventual materialization of development projects 
generated by the new highway. As described, this might have occurred in places where 
residents and/or political representatives were openly opposed to growth and/or the political 
process was less permeable to the pressures of development lobbies. Both the delays and the 
prohibitions on new development might have impacted on the evolution of housing prices in 
Spain; however, this claim is very difficult to verify due to the lack of data. Yet, were this to 
have been the case, we might conclude that the highway construction boom experienced in 
Spain during recent decades could also have contributed to fuel the boom in housing prices.  
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Tables and figures 
 
 
 
Table 1: 
 Evolution of land use policy outcomes in Spain, 1995-2007 
   1995 1999 2003 2007 
           Developable landt,1995 
/Developed land1995 
--.-- 0.286 0.733 1.135 
Developable landt  
/Developed land1995 
0.702 0.989 1.453 1.837 
          Developed landt,1995  
/Developed land1995 
--.-- 0.187 0.455 0.518 
          Housing unitst,1995  
/Housing units1995 
--.-- 0.087 0.202 0.387 
          Note: Municipalities of the Basque Country and Navarra not 
included. Source: Estadísticas Catastrales (several years), 
Dirección General del Catastro, Ministerio de Hacienda 
(http://www. catastro. meh.es/). 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: 
Evolution of the Spanish highway network, 1980-2011 
    
 
Km at the end  
of the period 
Km of new 
highways 
%  
Increase  
        
1980-1990 5,520 2,222 67.34 
1990-1995 7,950 2,430 44.02 
1995-2000 10,292 2,342 29.45 
2000-2003 11,582 1,290 12.53 
2003-2007 14,028 2,446 21.12 
2007-2011 16,322 2,294 16.35 
                                             Source: Anuario Estadístico (several years). Ministerio de 
Fomento  (www.fomento.es). 
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Table 3: 
 Effects of new highways on land use policies  
      Dep. var.: increase in Developable land (di,t-t0). 
 Main road Main road + Matching 
           (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
          (a) Overall effect of new highways 
hi 0.191 
(0.239) 
-0.079 
(0.244) 
-0.049 
(0.289) 
0.046 
(0.279) 
hiaftert 0.517 
(0.292)
*
 
0.437 
(0.184)
**
 
0.669 
(0.268)
**
 
0.886 
(0.293)
***
 
Adjusted R
2
 0.081 0.182 0.095 0.214 
 (b)  Effect of new highways over time 
hi startedt 0.417 
(0.338) 
0.337 
(0.244) 
0.715 
(0.377)
*
 
0.717 
(0.338)
**
 
hicompletedt 0.617 
(0.329)
*
 
0.538 
(0.245)
**
 
1.054 
(0.386)
***
 
1.056 
(0.322)
***
 
     startedt = completedt 
(F-test p-value) 
0.200 
(0.335) 
0.201 
(0.319) 
0.349 
(0.536) 
0.339 
(0.328) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.081 0.174 0.096 0.214 
     
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Control variables NO YES NO YES 
Obs. 1266 = 422  3 462 = 154  3 
          Notes: (1) di,t-t0= outcome variable, i.e. increase in the amount of developable land, as a proportion of initial 
amount of build-out land. (2) Main road = municipalities included in the control group are those with prior 
access to a Main road; Main road + Matching = municipalities included in control group are selected via 
matching from those with prior access to a Main road; (3) hi = treated units, i.e. municipalities gaining 
access to a new highway during the period. (4) aftert: Dummy identifying the treatment periods. (5) 
Estimation method: OLS estimation in columns (i) and (ii) and weighted least squares in columns (iii) and 
(iv). (6) Control variables: variables used in the estimation of the ‘propensity score’ (see Tables A.1 and A.2 
in the Annex). (7) Values in parentheses are standard errors; 
***, ** & * 
indicate that the coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels; standard errors clustered at the municipality level. 
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Table 4: 
Heterogeneous effects of new highways on land use policies  
      Dep. var.: increase in Developable land (di,t-t0). 
     (a) Demand and supply 
 Urban area 
population 
Rugged-
ness 
% Vacant 
land 
% Open 
land 
           (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
          hiaftert  (Dummy= Low) 0.231 
(0.320) 
1.237 
(0.506)
***
 
1.014 
(0.397)
**
 
0.306 
(0.415) 
hiaftert  (Dummy= High) 1.071 
(0.406)
**
 
0.529 
(0.289)
*
 
0.280 
(0.262) 
0.954 
(0.456)
**
 
High -  Low 
(F-test p-value) 
0.840 
(0.383)
**
 
-0.707 
(0.506)
**
 
-0.915 
(0.557)
*
 
0.647 
(0.576) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.325 0.342 0.295 0.305 
           (b) Preferences for/against development 
  % Home-
owners 
% Com-
muters 
Right-wing 
mayor 
Majority 
government 
           (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) 
          hiaftert  (Dummy= Low) 1.032 
(0.504)
**
 
1.160 
(0.477)
**
 
0.503 
(0.262)
*
 
0.341 
(0.167)
*
 
hiaftert  (Dummy= High) 0.653 
(0.303)
**
 
0.361 
(0.174)
*
 
1.215 
(0.478)
***
 
1.302 
(0.439)
***
 
High -  Low 
(F-test p-value) 
-0.377 
(0.574) 
-0.865 
(0.447)
*
 
0.711 
(0.387)
*
 
0.965 
(0.373)
***
 
Adjusted R
2
 0.325 0.334 0.341 0.345 
     Notes:  (1) Control group = Main road + Matching; all estimations include the same control variables as in Tables 
1 and 2. (2) Overall effect of new highways; we only report the coefficient of the interaction between hi aftert 
and the dummies defining each regime. (3) Low/High: in columns (i) to (vi) dummy equal to one if the interaction 
variable is higher than the median; in columns (vii) and (viii) High is a dummy equal to one if there is a Right-wing 
mayor and a Majority government, respectively, and equal to zero if there is a Left-wing mayor or a Coalition/ 
Minority government otherwise. 
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Table 5: 
Effects of new highways on building activity 
      Dep. var.: increase in  
Developed  land (bi,t-t0). 
Dep. var.: increase in  
Housing units (ui,t-t0). 
            (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
          (a) Overall effect of new highways 
hi -0.131 
(0.104) 
-0.015 
(0.245) 
-0.061 
(0.031)
**
 
-0.030 
(0.201) 
hiaftert 0.326 
(0.255) 
0.523 
(0.308)
*
 
0.126 
(0.039)
***
 
0.090 
(0.044)
**
 
     Adjusted R
2
 0.146 0.219 0.250 0.258 
 (b)  Effect of new highways over time 
histartedt 0.164 
(0.239) 
0.376 
(0.295) 
0.079 
(0.034)
**
 
0.051 
(0.040) 
hicompletedt 0.490 
(0.222)
**
 
0.612 
(0.241)
**
 
0.173 
(0.034)
**
 
0.130 
(0.062)
**
 
     startedt = completedt 
(F-test p-value) 
0.326 
(0.239) 
0.236 
(0.198)
*
 
0.093 
(0.072) 
0.079 
(0.049)
*
 
Adjusted R
2
 0.147 0.218 0.253 0.259 
 --.--    
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Control variables YES YES YES YES 
Obs. 1266  462 1266 462 
          Notes: (1) Control group: Main road in columns (i) and (iii), and Main road + Matching in columns (ii) and 
(iv). (2) Effects in municipalities gaining access to a new highway. (3) See Table 3. 
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Table 6: 
Spillover effects of new highways  
        Dep. var.: increase in  
Developable  land (di,t-t0). 
Dep. var.: increase in  
Housing units (bi,t-t0). 
 
Dep. var.: increase in  
Housing units (ui,t-t0). 
                Whole  
area 
Rest of  
Area 
Whole  
area 
Rest of  
area 
Whole  
area 
Rest of  
area 
               (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
              (a) Overall effect of new highways 
hi 0.024 
(0.209) 
0.038 
(0.224) 
-0.072 
(0.108) 
-0.035 
(0.244) 
0.023 
(0.178) 
0.010 
(0.126) 
hiaftert 0.273 
(0.104)
**
 
0.167 
(0.073)
**
 
0.165 
(0.072)
**
 
0.104 
(0.062)
*
 
0.112 
(0.057)
**
 
0.148 
(0.066)
**
 
Adjusted R
2
 0.247 0.254 0.200 0.212 0.291 0.288 
 (b)  Effect of new highways over time 
hi startedt 0.174 
(0.098)
*
 
0.137 
(0.074)
*
 
0.096 
(0.060)
*
 
0.064 
(0.052) 
0.063 
(0.033)
*
 
0.086 
(0.066) 
hicompletedt 0.410 
(0.236)
**
 
0.275 
(0.137)
***
 
0.258 
(0.121)
**
 
0.186 
(0.086)
**
 
0.135 
(0.057)
**
 
0.172 
(0.076)
**
 
startedt - completedt 
(F-test p-value) 
0.236 
(0.140)
*
 
0.139 
(0.063)
*
 
0.161 
(0.090)
*
 
0.121 
(0.063)
*
 
0.072 
(0.062)
*
 
0.086 
(0.034)
*
 
Adjusted R
2
 0.253 0.218 0.209 0.218 0.361 0.351 
              Notes: (1) Control group: Main road + Matching estimation; all estimations include time fixed effects and the same 
control variables as in column (iv) of Tables 1 and 2. (2) Whole area: average effect over all municipalities belonging to 
the same Local Labor Market as that gaining access to the new highway; Rest of area: average effect over the 
municipalities belonging to the same Local Labor Market, excluding the one/s obtaining access to the highway. (3) See 
Table 3.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  
Land use categories in Spain 
 
 
 
                                   
 
 
 
 
                                               Year 0                                   Year t 
 
Notes: Yellow: ‘Non-developable’ land (i.e., rural uses or protected 
land); Orange: ‘Developed’ land; Pink: ‘Developable’ land in Year 
0 (and also in Year t); Purple: Developable land in year t but not in 
year 0 (i.e., amount of land converted from rural to urban uses 
between Year 0 and Year t). 
 
 41 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: 
Spanish highway network in 2000 and segments built in 2000-03 and 2003-07  
 
                  Source: Official road maps published by the Ministry of Public Works (http://www. 
fomento.es) and authors’ own mapping using GIS software. 
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Figure 3:  
Selection of treated and control municipalities 
  a) Potentially treated (‘local labor market A’) b) Potential controls (‘local labor market B’) 
  
 
 
 Blue line: Old highway / Red line: New highway / Black line: Main road 
Violet areas: Treated =New highway + Main road  
Blue areas: ‘Local labor market’ treatment  
Yellow areas: Controls =No old highway + Main road 
Pink areas: Potential controls but Old highway or No main road 
Green areas: Potentially treated or controls but no data 
  Source: Authors’ own ellaboration. 
 
 
Figure 4: 
Treated and control municipalities in the map 
 
Source: (1) Official road maps published by the Ministry of Public Works 
(http://www.fomento.es) and authors’ own mapping using GIS software; (2) We use 
a layer of municipality boundaries provided by the National Geographic Institute 
(http://www.ign.es) to match highway segments with municipalities. 
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                                                      Figure 5: 
                                           Timing of the treatment 
 
 
Figure 6:   
Evolution of developable land (di,t) in Treated and Control municipalities 
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
 
                                          Treated                   Controls                 Confidence interval 
 
Notes: (1) Effects in municipalities with a new highway access. Coefficients 
estimated by Diff-in-diff + Matching. 
2007 
  
2003 
 
1999 
 
1995 
Crisis Crisis 
After treatment 
Started 
Before treatment 
Initial 
period (t0) 
Completed 
Validity  test  Years after 
treatment  
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Figure 7:   
Evolution of developed land (bi,t) in Treated and Control municipalities 
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
 
                                          Treated                   Controls                 Confidence interval 
 
     Notes: (1) See Figure 6. 
 
Figure 8:   
Evolution of housing units (ui,t) in Treated and Control municipalities 
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
 
                                          Treated                   Controls                 Confidence interval 
 
     Notes: (1) See Figure 6. 
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Appendix A:  
Modeling the effect of road improvements on land-use decisions  
In this section we use a simple model, adapted from Solé-Ollé and Viladecans-Marsal (2012), to 
predict the effect of road improvements on land-use policies. We pay special attention to the effect of 
interactions between road improvements and resident’s preferences for/against development and other 
policy drivers as, e.g., demand shocks and construction costs.  
In the model, the local incumbent takes into account the preferences of the two main 
stakeholder groups of land-use policies (Glaeser et al., 2005, Hilber and Robert-Nicoud, 
2010), namely voters (assumed to oppose development) and developers (assumed to be pro-
development). The local incumbent weights both the amount of political rents he will get in 
the present and the effect of his decision on the probability of re-election. Rents are higher the 
more land is allowed to be developed, since the developer’s profits increase the more land 
they are allowed to build on, and so do their contributions to the politicians. The probability 
of re-election is reduced when more land is allowed to be developed because we assume that 
the representative voter bears some costs from development
32
. The problem for the local 
incumbent can be stated as: 
                          TahdVpvc k hS,dR  argmaxd )) ,,(() ,),,((                         (A.1) 
Where R are political rents, which depend on: (i) the amount of new land allowed to be 
developed (i.e. converted from rural to urban uses), d, (ii) the (forecasted) shock in the 
demand for land in the community, S, which in turn depends on whether the municipality got 
access to a new highway, h, and on other exogenous demand factors, k, (iii) construction 
costs (e.g., terrain ruggedness), c, and (iv) the amount of vacant land at the beginning of the 
period, v (i.e. land which was considered developable by a past government decision, but that 
has not been yet developed).  We assume that rents are higher the more land is converted, 
R/(d)>0 and the higher the demand, R/S)>0. We justify these assumptions in two steps: 
(i) developers’ lobby willingness to contribute should increase with profits, and (ii) 
developer’s profits are higher the more land can be build out and the higher the prices the 
buildings command, and both variables are supposed to grow with S, which responds 
positively to h and k: S/(h)>0 and S/(k)>0. We also assume that rents are lower the 
more costly is to build (R/c<0) and the lower the amount of vacant land (R/v<0). If there 
is still land where the developers can build, there is no need to waste resources trying to force 
the conversion of more land. Finally, we assume 2R/(d)S>0, 2R/(d)c<0, and 
2R/(d)v<0, meaning that marginal political rents increase with land demand and decrease 
with construction costs and vacant land
33
.  
The second part of expression (1) denotes the expected utility of holding office in the 
future, and is the product of the probability of re-election, p, the discount factor,  , and the 
future exogenous return of being a politician, T. The probability of re-election depends on the 
the utility of the representative voter during the term, V (i.e., p/V>0), which we assume 
negatively depends on the amount of development allowed, d (i.e., V/(d)<0), and 
positively on the improved highway access, h (i.e., V/(h)>0), and on a set o preference 
shifters, a (i.e., V/a)<0), measuring the disamenity effects of new development. Here we 
                                                 
32
 The average homeownership rate in our sample is 92%, with a minimum of 60%, meaning the 
median voter is always a homeowner. Despite of this, renters could still have some influence on land 
policies, something that we take into account in the empirical analysis. 
33
 The micro-foundations of the behavior we are describing here can be provided by a traditional 
model of ‘urban growth controls’ (see, e.g.  Brueckner, 1999, and Brueckner and Lai, 1996).  
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also assume 2V)/(d)a<0), meaning that the marginal effects of development are more 
negative in places where the residents are more opposed to growth, and 2V/(d)(h)=0, 
which means that the construction of the new highway does not affect the marginal effect of 
development on utility
34
. In order to ease interpretation, the probability of re-election can be 
expressed as a linear function of the utility change. To do this, we shall assume that the voter 
will vote for the incumbent if V+  i, where  is the average popularity of the incumbent 
and i  is the reservation utility level of the voter. To make the problem tractable, we assume 
 is distributed uniformly on the support -1/2, 1/2. The higher the value of , the higher 
the density of swing voters, the more competitive is the election. The reservation utility i is 
assumed to have a zero mean and to be uniformly distributed on the support -1/2, 1/2. Given 
these assumption, the probability of re-election is just: p=1/2 - V. After plugging this into 
(1), we are able to obtain the FOC with respect to d:  
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This expression says that, in the margin, the incumbent chooses the amount of new land 
to develop so as to equate the value of additional rents and the loss in utility derived from not 
being re-elected. Note that the weight on voter’s welfare rises (and the weight put on rents 
obtained when satisfying lobby’s interests decreases) with the degree of political competition, 
a measured by the proportion of swing voters, . 
The effect of the highway improvement on the amount of new land allowed to be 
developed can be expressed as: 
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Since =/(d)<0 from the SOC and 2R/(d)S>0 and S/(h)>0 by assumption. This 
result says that we expect the new highway access will have a positive effect on the amount of 
new land allowed to be developed.  
Now, we can show that this effect is expected to be milder in places where residents are 
opposed to development (i.e., high a) and in places where developers have less (relative) 
influence over local politicians (i.e., high  ): 
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Since /(h)>0 and 2V/(d)a and V/(d) are negative by assumption. It is also 
straightforward to show (proofs are omitted but are available upon request) that the effect of 
roads is lower where it is difficult to build (i.e., high c) and stronger in places experiencing 
high demand shocks (i.e., high k) or with a low amount of vacant land to start with (i.e., low 
v), i.e., that and 2(d)/(h)c<0, 2(d)/(h)k>0 and 2(d)/(h)v<0. 
 
                                                 
34 This is an assumption also made in the traditional ‘urban growth control’ literature, which use linear 
specifications to model the relationship between amount of development and utility. This assumption 
helps a lot in simplifying the equations and getting more clear-cut predictions.   
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Appendix B: Additional tables 
Table A.1:  
Variable definitions and data sources 
    Definition Sources 
      h Dummy equal to one if a new highway segment 
located in the jurisdiction of the municipality was 
completed during the period 2003-2007 
Road maps from Ministerio de Fomento 
(several years) and authors’ own maps  
   Developable land 
 
(Developed land + Vacant land, year t) – 
(Developed land + Vacant land, year 1995) / 
Developed land, year 1995  
DCG, Dirección General del Catastro (several 
years): “Estadísticas catastrales”, http://www. 
catastro.meh.es / esp/estadisticas1. 
asp#menu1. (Developed land = ‘superficie 
edificada’, Vacant land = ‘superficie de 
solares’, Housing units = ‘unidades urbanas’) 
Developed land 
 
(Developed land, year t) – (Developed land, year 
1995) / Developed land, year 1995  
Housing units 
 
(Housing units, year t) – (Housing units, year 
1995) / Housing units, year 1995  
Vacant land 
 
Vacant land, year 1995) / 
Developed land, year 1995  
   Open Land 
 
Total land area of the municipality - Developed 
land, year 1995/ Developed land, year 1995  
INE (www.ine.es) &  DCG, Dirección 
General del Catastro (several years) 
‘Local labor markets’ as defined in Boix and 
Galletto (2004) based on commuter patterns  
 
Area’s Open Land  Total land area of the municipalities belonging to 
the same ‘local labor market’ - Developed land in 
these municipalities, year 1995/ Developed land 
in the se municipalities, year 1995 
Ruggedness Municipal average value of the terrain ruggedness 
index developed by Riley et al. (1999).  
Spanish 200-meter digital elevation model 
(http://www.ign.es/ign/layoutIn 
/modeloDigitalTerreno.do). 
Area’s ruggedness Average values for each area. ‘Local labor markets’ as defined in Boix and 
Galletto (2004) based on commuter patterns  
   Urban area population Resident population in the municipalities 
belonging to the same ‘local labor market’ in 
1996 
INE (www.ine.es), Census of Population 
(several years) 
 
‘Local labor markets’ as defined in Boix and 
Galletto (2004) based on commuter patterns  
 
Major urban areas as defined by the AUDES 
project on the basis of geographical continuity 
(see www. audes.es), 
Major urban area Dummy equal to one if municipality belonged to 
a major urban area as of 1996 
Population Resident population in 1996 
Population growth Growth in resident population between 1991 and 
1996 (in %) 
Unemployment  (Unemployed population in 1996/ Resident 
population over 16 and under 65 years in 1996)  
Commuters 
 
Commuters in 2001/ Resident  
population in 2001  
Homeowners 
 
Houses occupied by owner in 1991/  
Houses in 1991  
   Core PP region Regional government  (i.e., Autonomous 
Community) controlled by the Partido Popular 
(PP) during the whole period 1995-2007 
Ministerio del Interior, Base Histórica de 
Resultados Electorales, http://www. 
elecciones.mir.es/MIR/jsp /resultados 
index.htm. 
&  El País (2003): ‘Anuario Estadístico’ 
Swing PP region Regional government controlled by the PP during 
some part of the period 1995-2007 
Aligned mayor  Dummy = 1 if the mayor and the regional 
president belong to the same party 
Right-wing  Dummy equal to one if the mayor belongs to a 
party classified as right-wing (e.g., PP, CiU, etc.). 
See Solé-Ollé and Viladecans (2013) 
 
Majority  Dummy equal to one if the party of the mayor 
holds the majority of seats in the local council 
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Table A.2: Propensity score estimation 
  Variables  Coeff. (s.e.) 
  log(Urban area population) 0.646  
(0.107)
***
 
Dummy = Major urban area 1.394 
 (0.437)
***
 
log(Population) 0.173 
(0.120) 
% Population growth 0.835  
(0.675) 
log(Unemployed) 0.721  
(0.330)
**
 
% Vacant land 0.479  
(0.265)
*
 
log(Open land) 0.269  
(0.203) 
log(Area’s open land)   -0.375  
(0.241) 
log(Ruggedness) -0.869  
(0.278)
***
 
log(Area’s ruggedness) 0.599  
(0.437) 
Dummy = Core PP region    Unaligned mayor   1.514 
 (0.629)
**
 
Dummy =  Swing PP region    Aligned mayor   0.807 
 (0.359)
**
 
Constant  -6.997 
 (0.544)
***
 
Obs. 420 
Pseudo R
2
 0.360 
LR-2 162.68 
 (0.000) 
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Table A.3:  
Balance tests: Unmatched vs. Matched sample 
        Mean t-test % 
 bias 
%  
bias  Sample Treated Controls t p-value 
                        log(Urban area’s population) Unmatched 12.157 9.683 12.01 (0.000)
***
 115.3  
Matched 11.207 11.498 0.15 (0.877) -17.2 67.0 
                Dummy = Major urban area Unmatched 0.388 0.057 9.10 (0.000)
***
 85.8  
Matched 0.253 0.262 -0.18 (0.857) 10.1 88.3 
                log(Population) Unmatched 8.801 8.831 4.70 (0.000)
***
 52.1  
 Matched 8.873 8.941 -0.94 (0.346) -17.2 67.0 
                % Population growth Unmatched 0.031 0.169 -1.66 (0.097) -23.4  
 Matched 0.037 0.038 -0.01 (0.994) -0.0 75.8 
                log(Unemployed) Unmatched -3.362 -3.449 1.44 (0.152) 17.4  
 Matched -3.373 -3.387 4.2  (0.813) 4.2 99.4 
                % Vacant land Unmatched 0.693 0.560 2.00 (0.046)
**
 22.3  
 Matched 0.629 0.592 1.33 (0.184) 15.8 29.2 
                log(Open land) Unmatched 4.188 4.697 -3.29 (0.001)
***
 -37.6  
 Matched 4.413 4.417 1.04 (0.969) 0.6 98.5 
                log(Area’s open land) Unmatched 3.975 4.684 -5.26 (0.000)
***
 -60.8  
 Matched 4.245 4.200 0.25 (0.801) 3.7 93.2 
                log(Ruggedness) Unmatched 3.479 3.928 -4.91 (0.000)
***
 -31.2  
 Matched 3.588 3.624 -0.15 (0.882) -12.6 59.6 
                log(Area’s ruggedness) Unmatched 3.479 3.926 -4.88 (0.000)
***
 -52.3  
 Matched 3.502 3.607 -0.02 (0.841) -2.9 94.5 
                Dummy = Core PP region    
Unaligned mayor   
Unmatched 0.153 0.067 2.64 (0.009)
***
 27.6  
Matched 0.089 0.112 -0.52 (0.601) -8.0 70.9 
                Dummy =  Swing PP region    
Aligned mayor   
Unmatched 0.265 0.109 3.89 (0.000)
***
 40.9  
Matched 0.266 0.235 0.36 (0.717) 6.5 84.0 
                Pseudo-R
2
 Unmatched 0.360     
 Matched 0.029     
              
LR-2 Unmatched 162.12 (0.000)     
 Matched 6.54 (0.886)     
              Median Bias Unmatched     39.2     
 Matched     4.0     
         
 
 
 
 
